Názor, že poznanie je hodnotné, tvorí kľúčový predpoklad epistemológie. Vo svojej klasickej podobe je vyjadrený komparatívnou tézou, že poznanie je hodnotnejšie než pravdivá mienka. Rôzne teoretické pokusy o vysvetlenie hodnoty poznania však doteraz neboli definitívne úspešné. Môže za to najmä tzv. problém pohltenia, v dôsledku ktorého akýkoľvek konštituent poznania nad rámec pravdivej mienky nemôže byť zdrojom hodnoty poznania. Časť autorov preto obracia pozornosť k fenoménu porozumenia, ktoré označujú za primárnu epistemickú hodnotu, pričom skúmanie hodnoty poznania odsúvajú (...) do úzadia. V tejto situácii spočíva možné riešenie problému hodnoty poznania v odmietnutí predpokladu, že vysvetlenie hodnoty poznania musí byť univerzálne. Tým sa otvára priestor pre pluralistické koncepcie, ktoré rozličným poznatkom pripisujú odlišné druhy hodnôt. (shrink)

Tekst dotyczy trzech koncepcji doświadczenia religijnego: K. Dąbrowskiego, J. Fowlera i K. Osera. Swoje uzasadnienie znajdują one w psychologii rozwoju osobowości i nie są zależne od konkretnej historycznej religii lub teorii religii. Doświadczenie religijne opisywane jest za pomocą modelu rozwoju wielopoziomowego, rozwoju stadialnego i rozwoju orientacji religijnej. Ich kryteriami są postawy, wartości i świadomość, które kształtują się wraz z rozwojem poznawczym i moralnym człowieka, natomiast źródeł metodologicznych można szukać w teoriach rozwoju osobowości J. Piageta i E. Eriksona, L. Kohlberga.

In this article I am dealing mainly with the following notions: “perception apparatus” (Weltbildapparat), “view of the world” (Weltbild, picture of the world) and “representation”. The first and the second ones belong to the basic notions in the vocabulary of K. Lorenz’s evolutionary epistemology, the third in cognitive sciences. I seek to demonstrate the relationships between them. This analysis is put in a broader context, indicating the relationships between expensively developing cognitive sciences and evolutionary epistemology (much less popular today). It (...) is quite easy to determine what the perception apparatus is, however, it is harder to state what the view of the world, especially in its ontological aspect, is. Nevertheless, the view of the representation in the context of evolutionary epistemology points to the fact that this notion is still unclear and many representational features can be assigned to objects which, as it seems, are not representations according to cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Táto kritická štúdia sa zameriava na problematiku spolupráce a pravidiel, diskutovanú Jaroslavom Peregrinom v knihe Človek a pravidla. Okrem extenzívneho exkurzu do osnovy Peregrinových hlavných myšlienok a argumentov budú systematicky analyzované niektoré kľúčové otázky patriace do tejto interdisciplinárnej teoretickej oblasti, pričom sa kriticky posúdia niektoré prvky Peregrinovho špecifického prístupu. Konkrétne, budem argumentovať, že Peregrinom preferovaná koncepcia pravidla - ako propozičného poznania, že niečo by malo nejako byť - nemôže dobre slúžiť jeho zámerom, ak chce udržať jeho evolučný prístup k (...) pravidlám. (shrink)

Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v (...) tomto etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v „denaturalizácii“ morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. (shrink)

Starting from a decidedly Frijdian perspective on emotion in action, we adopt neurocognitive theories of action control to analyze the mechanisms through which emotional action arises. Appraisal of events vis-à-vis concerns gives rise to a determinate motive to establish a specific state of the world; the pragmatic idea of the action’s effects incurs the valuation of action options and a change in action readiness in the form of incipient ideomotor capture of the selected action. Forward modeling of the sensory consequences (...) of the selected action option allows for the evaluation and fine-tuning of anticipated action effects, which renders the emotional action impulsive yet purposive. This novel theoretical synthesis depicts the cornerstone principles for a mechanistic view on emotion in action. (shrink)

What are the criteria for reasonable clinical judgements? The reasonableness of macro-level decision-making has been much discussed, but little attention has been paid to the reasonableness of applying guidelines generated at a macro-level to individual cases. This paper considers a framework for reasonable clinical decision-making that will capture cases where relevant guidelines cannot reasonably be followed. There are three main sections. (1) Individual claims on healthcare from the point of view of concerns about equity are analysed. (2) The demands of (...) responsibility and equity on professional clinical performance are discussed, and how the combination of these demands emerges into seven requirements that constitute the framework is explored. Since this framework is developed to assist in reasonable clinical decision-making, practical implications of all these requirements are also suggested. (3) Challenges concerning the framework are discussed. First, a crucial presumption that the framework relies upon is considered—namely, clinicians’ willingness to justify their decisions as requested. Then how public deliberation may influence clinical decision-making is discussed. Next is a consideration of how clinicians’ need to have confidence in their own judgements in order to perform in a manner worthy of trust would be compatible with adherence to the framework supported by public deliberation. It is concluded that fair distribution in the interplay between macro- and micro-level considerations can be secured by legitimising procedures on each level, by ensuring well-organised and continuing public debate and by basing individual clinical judgements upon well-justified and principled normative bases. (shrink)

Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain that difference. (...) I argue that we can have or lack relational obligations to early fetuses in light of our own activities or choices, independent of the fetus’s own features or properties. Those relational obligations make the early fetus morally considerable to the persons who stand in a moral relation to it. Pregnant persons (and other participants in the procreative process) can come to have relational obligations to an early fetus just in virtue of their own decision to create a person, either by intentionally getting pregnant or by deciding to continue a pregnancy. That decision not only makes it appropriate for them to care about the fetus, but it also generates obligations to the fetus that they didn’t have before that decision. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Direct realism is less prone to internal incoherence as a theory of knowledge than alternative theories. The theory of Direct realism best grounds our capacity for cognition of the external world, whereas other epistemological theories claim to ground our capacity for cognition, but end in skepticism in the final analysis. I propose to show this contrast by bringing in different theories of a well-known Indirect realist, Bertrand Russell. Illustrating this point mainly through Russell makes (...) the approach purely historical in nature even when the paper includes a brief discussion of two theories in the current debate that support Direct realism. (shrink)

Since Erich Lindemann's seminal work on 'the symptomatology and management of acute grief' from 1944, it has been common to define grief through its particular emotional structure and dynamics. According to this perspective, grief announces itself in socalled 'pangs of grief' in which the bereaved is occasionally flooded by waves of emotions. This picture has become so ingrained in our understanding of grief that it has defined both public discourse on grief and contemporary clinical constructs. In this paper, I propose (...) that underneath grief's fluctuating emotivity, there is a deeper feeling of grief. This deeper feeling reflects an altered mode of being in the world in which the bereaved experiences herself as 'at a distance' from the worldly. I will refer to this state as world-distancing and emphasize it as a protective affective state that shields the bereaved from a limit situation in which the world has become overwhelming in the absence of the deceased. It is experienced as being in a bubble or as if enclosed in a kind of membrane that shields the bereaved from the intrusiveness and penetrating character of the world. Worlddistancing, however, comes with significant perils if the bereaved are unable to reattach to the world. I outline this danger as a state of existential loneliness that follows from what Eugené Minkowski termed a felt lack of vital contact with the world. (shrink)

“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya teoloji, mevcut anlayış üzerine, doğayla ilgili ampirik araştırmalarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte ayrıca panteistik bir (...) sonuçla da bağlantılı değildir. Bununla birlikte o, özel doğal olmayan yetilere (ESP, telepati, mistik deneyim) veya doğaüstü bilgi kaynaklarına (kutsal metinler, vahiy teolojisi, inanç otoriteleri, doğrudan doğaüstü iletişim) hitap etmekten kaçınır. Genel olarak, doğal din veya teoloji (bundan böyle “doğal teoloji” olarak anılacaktır), diğer felsefi ve bilimsel girişimlerle aynı rasyonel inceleme standartlarına uymayı amaçlamaktadır ve aynı değerlendirme ve eleştiri yöntemlerine tabidir. (shrink)

Modal ontolojik argüman, Tanrı’nın varlığını sadece bilfiil gerçek olan bu dünyada değil, bütün mümkün dünyalarda göstermeye yönelik bir argümandır. Anselm’in (1033-1109) Proslogion adlı eserinin 3. bölümünde “kendisinden daha büyüğü düşünülemeyen” şeklinde tanımlanan; Tanrı’nın var olmamasının da düşünülemeyeceğini, bu yüzden de varolmamasının imkansızlığı üzerinde kurulu yeni bir argüman bulunduğunu öne süren bazı araştırmacılar, bu argümanı mümkün dünyalar semantiği yardımıyla formüle edip, “modal ontolojik argüman” şeklinde adlandırmışlardır. Çok farklı şekillerde formüle edilmiş bu argüman kabaca Tanrı’nın mümkünse zorunlu olması, dolayısıyla bilfiil gerçek olan (...) bu dünyada da var olması gerektiğini savunur. (shrink)

In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser criticises findings by Kelly et al. that speak against the moral/conventional distinction, arguing that the experiment was confounded. First, we note that the results of that experiment held up when confounds were removed . Second, and more importantly, we argue that attempts to prove the existence of a M/C distinction are systematically confounded. In contrast to Fraser, we refer to data that support our view. We highlight (...) the implications for the moral/conventional theory. (shrink)

Background: Theoretically, the principle of justice is strong in healthcare priorities both nationally and internationally. Research, however, has indicated that questions can be raised as to how this principle is dealt with in clinical intensive care. Objective: The objective of this article is to examine how significant others may affect the principle of justice in the medical treatment and nursing care of intensive care patients. Method: Field observations and in-depth interviews with physicians and nurses in intensive care units (ICU). Emphasis (...) was placed on eliciting the underlying rationale for prioritisations in clinical intensive care with particular focus on clinicians’ considerations when limiting ICU treatment. Results: Significant others could induce an unintentional discrimination of ICU patients. Family members who were demanding received more time and attention for both the patient and themselves. Patients’ and families’ status and position and/or an interesting medical diagnosis seemed to govern the clinicians’ priorities of patients and families—consciously as well as unconsciously. The clinicians emphasised that patient information given through families was important. However, patients’ preferences and values conveyed to clinicians through their families were not always taken seriously. This even applied in cases with very serious prognoses and an explicit patient wish to forego life-prolonging treatment. Conclusion: The principle of justice was violated when qualified attention was given to significant others, and through this also to patients. Attention given to significant others was influenced by the healthcare workers’ professional and personal values, attitudes and interests. (shrink)

Context: Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. Problem: We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. Method: We provide the (...) necessary conceptual groundwork for explorations in second-order science, in which we discuss the differences between first- and second-order science and where we present a roadmap for second-order science. The article operates mainly with conceptual differentiations such as the separation between three seemingly identical concepts such as Science II, Science 2.0 and second-order science. Results: Compared with first-order science, the potential of second-order science lies in 1. higher levels of novelty and innovations, 2. higher levels of robustness and 3. wider integration as well as higher generality. As first-order science advances, second-order science, with re-entry as its basic operation, provides three vital functions for first-order science, namely a rich source of novelty and innovation, the necessary quality control and greater integration and generality. Implications: Second-order science should be viewed as a major expansion of traditional scientific fields and as a scientific breakthrough towards a new wave of innovative research. Constructivist content: Second-order science has strong ties with radical constructivism, which can be qualified as the most important root/origin of second-order science. Moreover, it will be argued that a new form of cybernetics is needed to cope with the new problems and challenges of second-order science. (shrink)

In this article I caution that María Lugones's critiques of Kimberlé Crenshaw's intersectional theory posit a dangerous form of epistemic erasure, which underlies Lugones's decolonial methodology. This essay serves as a critical engagement with Lugones's essay “Radical Multiculturalism and Women of Color Feminisms” in order to uncover the decolonial lens within Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality. In her assertion that intersectionality is a “white bourgeois feminism colluding with the oppression of Women of Color,” Lugones precludes any possibility of intersectionality operating as (...) a decolonial method. Although Lugones states that her “decolonial feminism” is for all women of color, it ultimately excludes Black women, particularly with her misconstruing of Crenshaw's articulation of intersectionality that is rooted within the Black American feminist tradition. I explore Lugones's claims by juxtaposing her rendering of intersectionality with Crenshaw's and conclude that Lugones's decolonial theory risks erasing Black women from her framework. (shrink)

I present a history of Kuhn’s discovery of paradigms, one that takes account of the complexity of the discovery process. Rather than emerging fully formed in Structure , the concept paradigm emerged through a series of phases. Early criticism of Structure revealed that the role of paradigms was unclear. It was only as Kuhn responded to criticism that he finally articulated a precise understanding of the concept paradigm. In a series of publications in the 1970s, he settled on a conception (...) of a paradigm as a concrete exemplar that functions as a guide to future research. (shrink)

This research examines the methodologies employed by cognitive psychologists to study “false memory,” and assesses if these methodologies are likely to facilitate scientific progress or perhaps constrain the conclusions reached. A PsycINFO search of the empirical publications in cognitive psychology was conducted through January, 2004, using the subject heading, “false memory.” The search produced 198 articles. Although there is an apparent false memory research bandwagon in cognitive psychology, with increasing numbers of studies published on this topic over the past decade, (...) few researchers have studied false memory as the term was originally intended—to specifically refer to planting memory for an entirely new event that was never experienced in an individual’s lifetime. Cognitive psychologists interested in conducting research relevant to assessing the authenticity of memories for child sexual abuse should consider the generalizability of their research to the planting of entirely new events in memory. (shrink)

At the University of Newcastle, health law and ethics is taught and assessed in each year of the five-year curriculum. However, the critical question for assessment remains: 'Does teaching ethics have a measurable effect on the clinical activity of medical students who have had such courses?' Those responsible for teaching confront this question each year they sit down to construct their assessment tools. Should they assess what the student knows? Should they assess the student's moral reasoning, that is, what decisions (...) the student makes, and, how these decisions are justified, or should they assess what the student actually does when dealing with patients in the clinical setting, and how he or she does it? From 1982 to 1991, assessment at Newcastle was primarily aimed at determining the quality of the students' ethics knowledge base. This paper describes the strengths and limitations of a purely knowledge-based method of evaluation and why in 1992, we are now attempting to redefine and assess, what we call 'clinical ethical competence' in terms of how students actually apply this knowledge base in a controlled clinical context. (shrink)

Gestational surrogacy as a treatment for infertility is being practised in some well-known medical institutions in Tehran and some other cities in Iran. While the majority of Muslims in the world are Sunni, the majority of Iranians are Shiite. Most Sunni scholars do not permit surrogate motherhood, since it involves introducing the sperm of a man into the uterus of a woman to whom he is not married. Most Shiite scholars, however, have issued jurisprudential decrees (fatwas) that allow surrogate motherhood (...) as a treatment for infertility, albeit only for legal couples. They regard this practice as transferring an embryo or fetus from one womb to another, which is not forbidden in Shiite jurisprudence. Nevertheless, there are some controversies concerning some issues such as kinship and inheritance. The main ethical concern of Iran’s experience with gestational surrogacy is the monetary relation between the intended couple and the surrogate mother. While monetary remuneration is practised in Iran and allowed by religious authorities, it seems to suffer from ethical problems. This article proposes that this kind of monetary relation should be modified and limited to reimbursement of normal costs. Such modification requires new legislation and religious decrees. (shrink)

We examined unconscious priming in a stem-completion task with both identity and form-related primes. Participants were given exclusion instructions to avoid completing a stem with a briefly flashed masked word . In Experiment 1, priming of around 7% occurred for both identity and form-based primes at a 33 ms exposure duration. When examining only trials in which the participants failed to identify the prime, this effect increased to 12% for identity primes, but remained the same for form-based primes. In Experiment (...) 2, priming without prime identification was 9% for identity primes, 4% for homophone primes, and 3% for orthographic control primes. Although identity priming was greater than form priming in both experiments, regression analyses revealed that orthographic and phonological overlap alone between the flashed primes and targets could completely account for unconscious identity priming. Hence, we conclude that masked words may only activate their sublexical orthographic and phonological representations and not their lexical representations. (shrink)

Clinician gate-keeping is the process whereby healthcare providers prevent access to eligible patients for research recruitment. This paper contends that clinician gate-keeping violates three principles that underpin international ethical guidelines: respect for persons or autonomy; beneficence or a favourable balance of risks and potential benefits; and justice or a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research. In order to stimulate further research and debate, three possible strategies are also presented to eliminate gate-keeping: partnership with professional researchers; collaborative research (...) design and clinician education. (shrink)

Researchers have postulated that deficits in cognitive control are associated with, and thus may underlie, the perseverative thinking that characterises generalised anxiety disorder. We examined associations between cognitive control and levels of spontaneous state rumination following a stressor in a sample of healthy control participants and participants with GAD. We assessed cognitive control by measuring working memory capacity, defined as the ability to maintain task-relevant information by ignoring task-irrelevant information. To this end, we used an affective version of the reading (...) span task with valenced distractors. Lower WMC in the presence of negative distractors was associated with greater state rumination in the GAD group, but not in the CTL group. These findings suggest that difficulty maintaining task-relevant information due to interference from negative distractors contributes to perseverative thinking in GAD. (shrink)

Purpose: This paper is a brief introduction to enactive cognitive science: a description of some of the main research concerns; some examples of how such concerns have been realized in actual research; some of its research methods and proposed explanatory mechanisms and models; some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science; and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Enactive cognitive science is an approach to the study of mind that seeks to explain how the structures (...) and mechanisms of autonomous cognitive systems can arise and participate in the generation and maintenance of viable perceiver-dependent worlds -- rather than more conventional cognitivist efforts, such as the attempt to explain cognition in terms of the ``recovery'' of (pre-given, timeless) features of The (objectively-existing and accessible) World. As such, enactive cognitive science is resonant with radical constructivism. Research implications: As with other scientific efforts conducted within a constructivist orientation, enactive cognitive science is broadly ``conventional'' in its scientific methodology. That is, there is a strong emphasis on testable hypotheses, empirical observation, supportable mechanisms and models, rigorous experimental methods, acceptable criteria of validation, and the like. Nonetheless, this approach to cognitive science does also raise a number of specific questions about the scope of amenable phenomena (e.g., meaning, consciousness, etc.) -- and it also raises questions of whether such a perspective requires an expansion of what is typically considered within the purview of scientific method (e.g., the role of the observer/scientist). (shrink)

The idea of moral reform requires that morality be more than a description of what people do value, for there has to be some measure against which to assess progress. Otherwise, any change is not reform, but simply difference. Therefore, I discuss moral reform in relation to two prescriptive approaches to common morality, which I distinguish as the foundational and the pragmatic. A foundational approach to common morality (e.g., Bernard Gert’s) suggests that there is no reform of morality , but (...) of beliefs, values, customs, and practices so as to conform with an unchanging, foundational morality. If, however, there were revision in its foundation (e.g., in rationality), then reform in morality itself would be possible. On a pragmatic view, on the other hand, common morality is relative to human flourishing, and its justification consists in its effectiveness in promoting flourishing. Morality is dependent on what in fact does promote human flourishing and therefore, could be reformed. However, a pragmatic approach, which appears more open to the possibility of moral reform, would need a more robust account of norms by which reform is measured. (shrink)

Harris’ reply to our defence of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence’s (NICE) current cost-effectiveness procedures contains two further errors. First, he wrongly draws a conclusion from the fact that NICE does not and cannot evaluate all possible uses of healthcare resources at any one time and generally cannot know which National Health Service (NHS) activities would be displaced or which groups of patients would have to forgo health benefits: the inference is that no estimate is or can be made (...) by NICE of the benefits to be forgone. This is a non-sequitur. Second, he asserts that it is a flaw at the heart of the use of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as an outcome measure that comparisons between people need to be made. Such comparisons do indeed have to be made, but this is not a consequence of the choice of any particular outcome measure, be it the QALY or anything else. (shrink)

Güvenilirci (reliabilist) bilgi teorisi, çağdaş epistemik gerekçelendirme kuramları içerisinde, dışsalcı (externalist) kuramın bir türü olarak kendisine yer bulmaktadır. Kısaca, bir inancı gerekçelendiren şeyin o inancın oluşturulduğu sürecin güvenilirliği olduğunu öne süren bu yaklaşım, bu bilişsel süreçleri özne dışı unsurlara bağladığı içinde dışsalcı bir pozisyonda yer almaktadır. Bu bilgi teorisinin tam karşı konumunda yer alan içselci (internalist) bilgi teorisi ise, özne merkezli bir yaklaşımla, doğru inancı gerekçelendirecek yöntemin, kişinin kendi zihinsel yapısından yola çıkarak, belli kognitif süreçler sonucunda ulaşılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Epistemik (...) gerekçelendirme kuramları içerisinde birçok tartışmada kendisine yer bulan bu iki bilgi teorisi, kendi içerisinde de birçok farklı kurama kapı aralamıştır. Burada içselci bilgi teorisinden ortaya çıkan erişim içselciliği, farkındalık içselciliği gibi kuramları ve dışsalcı bilgi teorisinden ortaya çıkan süreç güvenilirciliği, gösterge güvenilirciliği ve erdem güvenilirciliği gibi farklı türden kuramları örnek olarak verebiliriz. Öte yandan çağdaş epistemolojideki bu tartışmalar, dini epistemoloji içerisinde de kendisine yer bulmuştur. Özellikle Alvin Plantinga, kendi dini epistemolojisi içerisinde dışsalcı bir tutum sergilemiş ve son dönem çalışmaları içerisinde de güvenilirci bir anlayışla Tanrı inancının epistemik mahiyetini ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Bu makalede öncelikle dışsalclık ve onun bir türü olan güvenilirci bilgi anlayışını ve bu kuramlara getirilen eleştirileri ele almaya çalışacağız, daha sonra A. Plantinga’nın son dönem dini epistemolojisinin de yönünü belirleyen güvence (warrant) kavramını açıklayıp, bu kavramın bütün teist dinlere uygulanabilirliğini sorgulayacağız. (shrink)

Çağdaş epistemoloji içerisinde, dışsalcı, güvenilirci ve erdeme dayalı epistemolojik tartışmaların bir benzerini, dini epistemoloji içerisinde etkili bir şekilde yer edinen ve reformcu epistemoloji olarak bilinen yaklaşım üzerinden görebilmek mümkündür. Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff ve William Alston gibi filozofların öne çıktığı bu yaklaşımın ana iddiası, kanıta ya da argümana dayanmaksızın, Tanrı’nın varlığına inanmanın bütünüyle doğru, rasyonel, makul ve güvenilir olacağı şeklindeki bir tezdir. Kanıtın, gerekçelendirme için zorunlu bir koşul olmadığı fikri, algısal deneyimlerin gerekçelendirilmesine benzer şekilde, dini deneyimlerin de öyle olduğu ve (...) dolayısıyla, aynı epistemik statüye sahip olması gerektiğini öne süren, eşitlik tezine dayanır. İlk ortaya çıktığı günden bugüne, üzerinde çokça konuşulan ve tartışılan bir yaklaşım olan reformcu epistemoloji, özellikle son beş yıl içerisinde, oldukça farklı bir hale gelmiştir. Zira bu yaklaşımı, kanıtsalcılıkla uyumlu, erdem epistemolojisiyle bağlantılı ve diğer teistik dinler üzerinden değerlendiren yeni çalışmalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makalede, reformcu epistemoloji ana hatlarıyla ele alınmıştır. Beraberinde, ona yöneltilen itirazlara değinilmiş ve sonrasında, bahsi geçen yenilik iddiaları soruşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, teistik inancın rasyonalitesiyle ilgili, farklı bir bakış açısı sunulmuştur. (shrink)

Hristiyan inancı içerisinde merkezi konuma sahip olan mevzulardan birisi de, İsa’nın ölümünden üç gün sonra diriltildiğine yönelik olan inançtır. Hristiyan eskatolojisinin de dayanak noktasını oluşturan bu mevzu, dinler tarihi ya da teoloji gibi disiplinlerin içerisinde tartışıldığı gibi, çeşitli Hristiyan düşünürlerce, din felsefesi disiplini içerisinde de tartışılmıştır. Din felsefesi açısından bakıldığında, konunun merkezi konumda olması, bu mevzunun rasyonel bir zeminde tartışılıp tartışılamayacağını da beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, özellikle din felsefesi içerisinde birçok Hristiyan düşünür tarafından konu ele alınmış ve farklı çevrelerce de (...) mevzuya yönelik karşı itirazlar dile getirilmiştir. Bu noktada yapılan tartışmaların içeriğine baktığımızda, mucize kavramı önem taşımakla birlikte, Hristiyan düşünürlerin argüman haline getirdikleri ve bir delil olarak öne sürdükleri “Boş mezar” ve “Tanıklıklar gibi birçok farklı husususun din felsefesi açısından tartışıldığını söyleyebiliriz. Ayrıca bazı ateist düşünürlerin bu delillere yönelik itirazları olmakla birlikte, bazı Hristiyan tarihçilerinde konuya ilişkin ciddi itirazları bulunmaktadır. Biz de bu makalemizde, İsa’nın ölümünden sonra dirilişinin rasyonel bir şekilde izahının nasıl olabileceği sorusunu merkeze alıp, konuyu Hristiyan düşünürlerin bakış açısından değerlendirmeye çalıştık. Bu noktada İslam gibi farklı dinlerde ve farklı anlatılarda karşımıza çıkan Hz. İsa figürünü konumuzun dışında tuttuğumuzu ayrıca belirtelim. Çünkü bizim yazımızın konusunu oluşturan kişi Hristiyan inancındaki İsa ve bu din içerisinde önem taşıyan kutsal metinler ve bu metinlerde geçen anlatılar oldu. Bu açıdan bakıldığında yazımız içerisinde, konuya ilişkin doğrudan bir teoloji ya da dinler tarihi çerçevesinde değerlendirme yapmaktan çok, din felsefesi içerisinde bize sunulan tartışmalardan yola çıkarak eleştirilerimizi ve tahlillerimizi dile getirmeye çalıştığımızı ifade edebiliriz. (shrink)